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The arguments for fiscal as well as monetary rules in a monetary union aiming at low inflation, 
the main weaknesses in the Stability and Growth Pact, and proposals for its reform are reviewed. 
Our  own  proposal  for  reforming  the  SGP  is  put  forward:  a  requirement  for  eurozone  Member 
States to enact entrenched legislation which would forbid budgets that led to public debt exceeding 
a certain proportion of GDP. Countries which failed to enact such provisions or which rescinded 
them could not remain in the eurozone. This would solve the key “enforcibility problem” that the 
SGP  faces,  without  centralizing  fiscal  power  in  the  European  Commission.  However,  effective 
reform proposals are unlikely to be politically acceptable, and the SGP is likely to continue to be a 
dead letter. This suggests that the EMU was implemented prematurely.  
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1. The fundamental problem 
The most convincing justification for the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is the existence of a 
severe free rider problem in a monetary union with a number of large countries. Ever since it was 
discovered (probably by the Emperor Diocletian in the second century) that inflation can be used to 
reduce the government’s debt burden, a “fatal nexus” has existed between government debt and 
governmental control over initially the mint, then the printing press and finally the central bank. Not 
only is it possible for a government that controls the creation of money to reduce its real debt 
burden by generating inflation, but this fact is known to money holders and affects their willingness 
to hold government created money. Negative effects on economic efficiency, savings, economic 
growth and even on so called seignorage (government revenue from the creation of money) follow 
from the “option to inflate” held by all governments.  
A number of mechanisms have therefore been invented to try and eliminate (or at the least 
severely limit) this option. They include fixing the parity of the state issued currency to one which is 
not  so  issued  (the  gold  standard,  currency  boards,  unilateral  dollarization  or  euroization)  and 
establishing an independent central bank. One problem has nevertheless persisted: how binding 
will such constraints on a government’s monetary behaviour be when it actually faces the choice 
between debt default and breaking or rewriting such self imposed rules? Recent experience in 
Argentina suggests that “monetary rules” may not be very binding in this situation, even if the final 
result in Argentina turned out to be both the breaking of the rules and government debt default. 
The result has been growing interest in “fiscal rules” which are designed to prevent public debt 
from  reaching  a  level  at  which  it  could  become  unserviceable,  and  might  therefore  present  a 
temptation for government to inflate it away. Gordon Brown’s self-imposed so-called “golden rule” 
is an example from Britain1, while the Polish constitutional limit on public debt to 60% of GDP is 
another. 
The problem of the link between fiscal and monetary prudence takes on an extra dimension in 
a  monetary  union  which  consists  of  a  number  of  large  independent  fiscal  jurisdictions.  The 
Germans have always feared the following scenario: less monetarily and fiscally prudent countries 
would  take  advantage  of  the  increased  credibility  and  lower  interest  rates  which  a  European 
monetary union would bring in order to increase their public debt to levels at which the monetary 
rules of the union would loose their credibility. In anticipation of the ensuing future inflation, interest 
rates would rise for all. In exporting German monetary credibility to all, the EMU would then end up 
by importing other members’ lack of credibility to Germany.2 
                                                 
1 By this fiscal deficits should be balanced over the economic cycle except to the extent to which they pay for net 
public investment. 
2 This may be part of the reasoning behind German opposition to unilateral euroization, although this is misplaced, 
as a unilaterally euroized country has no right to ECB support for its banking system and would be unable to generate 
euro inflation itself (see Bratkowski and Rostowski, 2002).  
                                                                          Studies & Analyses No. 275 – Jacek Rostowski 
7 
Nor is such a fear fanciful. Germany and other traditionally prudent countries such as Austria 
and the Netherlands are massively outvoted on the existing Governing Council of the ECB, and will 
be so even more after enlargement of EMU to the East. 
An  additional  problem  is  that  the  ECB  does  have  some  responsibility  for  the  stability  of 
member states’ banking systems.3 Given the high levels of government debt held by banks in 
many EMU member states, in the case of default by an EMU member government it could be 
legitimately argued that this responsibility requires intervention to save the banking system of the 
country  concerned.  Given  the  extremely  limited  capital  resources  of  the  European  System  of 
Central Banks4 such intervention could only take the form of generating inflation.5  
There  is  also  a  further,  deeper,  problem.  Whereas  the  ECB  could  allow  small  countries’ 
governments to default on their public debt, the consequences of allowing a major state to default 
and  its  banking  system  to collapse  could  be massively  depressive  for  the  whole  union.  In  the 
absence of a monetary union, such a situation could be avoided by the affected country inflating 
the problem away. Within the eurozone it can only be avoided by the ECB generating inflation in 
the whole monetary union.6  
The special problem posed by the existence of a few large independent fiscal jurisdictions 
within a monetary union is highlighted by the absence of any federal level fiscal rules binding on 
individual states in the USA. This is partly the result of most states having state-level balanced 
budget rules. But it may also result from the fact that there are 50 states, with California (the 
largest) accounting for one eighth of the union’s GDP (and about one sixteenth of government 
expenditure in the USA), as compared to the 30% weight of Germany within the eurozone. 
Fiscal rules in a monetary union with a few large independent fiscal jurisdictions are therefore 
even more important for guaranteeing the long-term credibility of its monetary rules than they are in 
a unitary state.  
2. Demand spillovers 
There is little evidence for strong spill-over effects. Large econometric models have generated 
insignificant (or even negative) spill-over effects [Thygessen,  1998 ]. An exception was the very 
large  increase  in  the  German  deficit  post-unification,  which  had  perceptible  positive  spill-over 
                                                 
3 By Art.3 of the ECB Statute, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to which the ECB is central, has the 
responsibility of promoting the smooth functioning of payments systems. 
4 The ECB and the National Central Banks of the eurozone member states. 
5 This is why Ivo and Lemmen [1999] propose that government debt within a MU should not be treated as having 
zero risk as it is under present Bank for International Settlements (BIS) guidelines. Such a move is justified by the formal 
unavailability of the inflation option within the eurozone. Moreover, setting limits on single government debt exposure by 
banks would encourage diversification of banking system assets, making banks less exposed to default by their home 
country  government  (although  partly  at  the  cost  of  making  them  more  exposed  to  default  by  other  eurozone 
governments).  
6 I exclude the possibility of the ECB providing the affected banking system with liquidity, since the problem we are 
discussing is one of the solvency of the government concerned and therefore of the banking system of the country as 
well. Such a problem cannot be resolved by mere injections of liquidity.  
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effects  on  demand  initially.7  However,  it  is  unclear  that  an  excessive  deficit  provision  helps  a 
monetary union to deal with this problem, whereas a centralisation on fiscal policy authority is 
unlikely to be politically acceptable. Thygessen suggests voluntary co-operation (as provided for by 
the Maastricht Treaty) as the least bad solution of the spill-over problem. 
3. The weaknesses of the SGP 
i. Excessive deficit procedure v. SGP.  The eurozone’s fiscal rules consist of two parts: (1) 
the excessive deficit provision and procedure and (2) the SGP proper. The excessive deficit and 
the procedures to deal with one are incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty and its protocols. An 
excessive deficit exists is either of two conditions exists: (1) an EU member’s fiscal deficit exceeds 
the  so-called  reference  value  of  3%  of  GDP,  or  (2)  its  debt/GDP  ratio  exceeds  60%.  All  EU 
members are required to avoid excessive deficits (defined as above). EU members who belong to 
the eurozone can be punished on the basis of the so-called “excessive deficit procedure” if they 
exceed the reference values for the fiscal deficit or public debt and are found to have done so by 
the  Council  of  Ministers.  Punishment  can  amount  to  fines  of  up  to  0.5%  of  GDP  yearly  for 
persistent offenders. This is a large amount of money, current gross contributions to the EU being 
slightly over 1% of GDP, and the net contributions of large net contributors such as Germany and 
Italy being 0.2% of GDP. 
The SGP proper, on the other hand, consists of one political declaration by the European 
Council  (of  Heads  of  State  and  Government)  and  two  regulations  issued  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers.8 The Pact does two main things: (1) it introduces the new obligation for states to achieve 
medium-term  budgetary  positions  close  to  balance  or  in  surplus;  and  (2)  tightens  up  the 
procedures for identifying and for punishing excessive deficits among states which have adopted 
the euro. Thus, the excessive deficit procedure is thus quite strongly legally anchored, and allows 
for heavy fines on delinquent Member States, while the SGP has a far less formal legal basis, and 
no procedure to punish a failure to comply with the objective of medium term balance. 
ii. Deficit vs. Debt aspects.  The effect of this greater legal and institutional weight given to 
the excessive deficit provision as compared to the SGP was compounded by the fact that the fiscal 
deficit requirement of the excessive deficit provision was treated with great seriousness, while its 
public debt/GDP requirement was largely ignored. As a result, primacy has been given to what is a 
short-term requirement (keeping the general government deficit below 3% of GDP) compared to 
                                                 
7 The subsequent increase in interest rates and ensuing fall in investment demand was a “pecuniary externality”, i.e. 
one in which markets transmit the right signals from one country to another. European (and indeed world-wide) interest 
rates do (and should) increase in response to a large increase in demand for financing by a major government. In the 
absence of a monetary union a larger part of the adjustment would occur through an appreciation of the currency of the 
state concerned. In the presence of the monetary union more of it has to occur through an increase in interest rates 
throughout  the  union.  However,  such  an  increase  is  preferable  to  some  other  form  of  rationing,  and  may  well  be 
preferable to not allowing the deficit to occur in the first place. 
8 The first made at the Amsterdam summit of 1997, the latter a few weeks later.  
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the medium-term requirement of achieving fiscal balance over the economic cycle and the long 
term requirement of limiting public debt to less than 60% of GDP.  
As we have seen, it is excessive public debt that constitutes the real threat to the credibility of 
a  currency  union’s  monetary  rules.  Yet  Italy,  Belgium  and  Greece  were  allowed  to  join  the 
eurozone with debt/GDP levels of over 100%. Furthermore, by focussing on the fiscal deficit aspect 
of the excessive deficit provision in the Maastricht criteria for eurozone accession, while keeping 
the SGP requirements legally weakly grounded and unsupported by effective sanctions, the EU 
created a situation in which the incentives for Member States were highly asymmetric. States had 
a strong incentive to bring their deficits below 3% in order to qualify for eurozone membership. But 
once this had been achieved in 1998, they had little incentive to continue to improve their fiscal 
positions  in  the  relatively  good  years  of  1999-2001,  so  as  to  satisfy  the  SGP  medium-term 
objective, given the absence of sanctions for such behaviour.  
iii.  The  alleged  “stupidity”  of  the  pact.  Many  of  the  SGP’s  problems  stem  from  these 
“original sins”:  
1.  The fact  that  some countries failed  to  achieve  medium-term fiscal  balance  in  1999-
2001,  meant  that  they  had  very  little  scope  to  allow  automatic  fiscal  stabilizers  to 
operate  once  conditions  deteriorated  in  2001-3,  without  coming  up  against  the 
excessive deficit provision. 
2.  The  fact  that  the  fiscal  deficit  aspect  of  the  excessive  deficit  provision  was  made 
paramount, instead of the public debt aspect, meant that a longer term approach, which 
would have allowed low debt countries to run larger deficits than those allowed by the 
Maastricht Treaty when they ran into bad economic times had to be ruled out. 
Had either of these processes not occurred, we would not be talking today about a “stupid” and 
“inflexible” SGP.  
We have already discussed the reasons for the weakness of the medium-term goal of fiscal 
balance.  There  were  also  reasons  for  emphasising  deficit  over  debt  in  the  excessive  deficit 
provision:  
1.  The correct measurement of public debt is quite problematic. The measure chosen was 
gross public sector financial debt. Thus, a government with significant financial assets 
(e.g. in the form of loans to LDC borrowers in good standing) would be penalised. So 
would  a  state  which  undertook  pension  or  health  reforms  which  created  “funded” 
systems of finance for these needs, as that would transform so-called “implicit” debt 
(which does not count under the Maastricht provision) into explicit debt which does.9  
2.   Had the excessive deficit provision successfully prevented deficits exceeding 3% of 
GDP, then it would likely have led to significant reductions in the debt/GDP ratio. The 
relationship between the deficit and the debt/GDP ratio is given by:  
D/Y = gy * B/Y      (1) 
                                                 
9 One valid reason for leniency to Belgium in spite of its high debt, was that it has high levels of funded provision for 
both pensions and health care.  
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Where D/Y is the fiscal deficit, gy is the growth rate of nominal GDP and B/Y is the 
steady state public debt/GDP ratio.10 So that with the GDP deflator increasing at about 
1.5%  yearly  and  real  GDP  growth  expected  to  be  about  2%  (giving  nominal  GDP 
growth of 3.5%), deficits on average of 2.5% would lead the debt/GDP ratio to converge 
on 71.4%. While this does not satisfy the excessive deficit provision, it is still a level 
which is unlikely to threaten government solvency.11 
3.  However, the main reasons seem to have been political: 
a.  There  was  no  political  will  to  exclude  Italy,  Belgium  and  Greece  from  the 
eurozone. 
b.  There  was  an  unwillingness  to  delay  the  launch  of  the  EMU  project  until 
measurement problems had been resolved. 
c.  The  European  Commission  seems  to  have  thought  that  stressing  the  fiscal 
deficit and the goal of medium term fiscal balance in the SGP, when combined 
with  “multilateral  convergence  and  surveillance  procedure”,12  could  form  the 
basis for the Commission gaining a key role in determining union-wide fiscal 
policy. Emphasis on the debt aspect of the excessive deficit provision would 
have left more room for policy discretion in the hands of Member States, and 
thus undermined the hopes of the Commission.  
iv.  Lack  of  enforcibility.  However,  the  fundamental  problem  with  the  SGP  is  its  lack  of 
enforcibility. Countries are not automatically declared in breach of the excessive deficit procedure. 
They can only be so declared by a vote of the Council of Finance Ministers, taken by qualified 
majority.  In  a  situation  in  which  several  large  and  influential  countries  either  have  excessive 
deficits, or are close to having them, such a declaration is unobtainable, even though the country 
voted on is not allowed to participate in the voting.13  
In fact enforceability has not been uniformly weak. Small countries have until now on the 
whole respected both the excessive deficit proviso and the medium term goal of fiscal balance (the 
only serious exception has been Portugal).  
 
                                                 
10 The derivation of the formula is straightforward. The yearly change in the public debt equals the deficit of the 
public sector, so that ￿B/￿t (the change in public debt) = D. Now B = (B/Y)*Y. If we take the time derivative of B we get: 
￿B/￿t = (B/Y)￿Y/￿t + Y￿(B/Y)/￿t. After setting D = ￿B/￿t we get: D =  (B/Y)￿Y/￿t + Y￿(B/Y)/￿t. Dividing by Y, we get: D/Y = 
(B/Y)(￿Y/￿t)/Y + ￿(B/Y)/￿t = gY(B/Y) + ￿(B/Y)/￿t. Now in the steady state ￿(B/Y)/￿t = 0, so we are left with: D/Y = gY(B/Y). 
11 The Maastricht Treaty limit on B/Y < 0.6 together with the deficit limit on D/Y < 0.03, therefore implies a nominal 
growth rate of 5%. Even with inflation at (rather than under) the 2% p.a. ceiling set by the ECB, this implies a real growth 
rate of 3% p.a., which is improbably high. 
12  The  Commission  develops  Union-wide  “broad  economic  guidelines”  annually,  and  Member  States  are  then 
required to develop “stability programmes” (for eurozone members) and “convergence programmes” (for non-eurozone 
members) which must be consistent with the BEGs. 
13 In November 2003 France, Germany and Portugal were projecting excessive deficits for the fourth year running, 
and Italy was close to an excessive deficit.  
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Table 1. Small is Beautiful (1997-2002) 
  Big Three  Small Eight  Spain  UK 
Fiscal balance  -2.06  0.13  -1.29  0.46 
Growth  1.93  3.95  3.55  2.57 
Source: D.Gros [2004] 
What we therefore have had so far is an “asymmetry of good behaviour”. The fact that 
Ireland was actually censured in 2002 by the Council of Ministers for not increasing its surplus 
sufficiently  suggests  that  we  have  also  been  witnessing  the  likelihood  of  an  “asymmetry  of 
enforcement” (at least in the perceptions of the small countries themselves). However, with the 
refusal  of  the  Council  to  punish  France  and  Germany  in  November  2003,  enforceability  has 
presumably collapsed for all Member States, both large and small.  
Whether this will lead to a sharp deterioration in fiscal performance among the small states 
is,  however,  unclear.  Because  of  their  size  they  can  be  allowed  to  default  on  their  debt,  with 
relatively limited impact on the eurozone economy as a whole. Knowing this, they may well fear 
sharply rising interest rates in the face of any large deterioration of their public debt position, and 
this may be sufficient in itself to dissuade them from lax fiscal policy. However, such responsible 
behaviour by small Member States would be only a limited consolation. It is after all the large 
states which can, by their fiscal irresponsibility, threaten the sustainability of the EMU’s monetary 
rules. Of course, France and Germany still have quite manageable public debt/GDP ratios, so 
there still is time to repair the breach in the SGP. The question is how that should best be done. 
4. Proposals to improve the pact 
A number of proposals for the re-engineering of the Pact have been made. Four main kinds of 
mechanism have been suggested. 
i. Expenditure rules. Two main mechanisms have been proposed – “permanent balance” and 
the  so-called  “golden  rule”.  Permanent  balance  involves  forecasting  future  tax  revenues  and 
government expenditures and calculating their present value. As long as the two are equal, there is 
no  fundamental  shortfall  of revenues,  even  if  there  is  a  large  deficit  at  any  particular  moment 
[Buiter  and  Grafe,  2002].  In  particular,  countries  that  expect  to  have  high  growth  rates  (and 
therefore much higher future revenues) can afford much higher deficits in the present. The idea is 
as well founded as its basic assumption – that the future can be forecast with confidence.  
The second mechanism within this approach is the UK Treasury’s golden rule, by which net 
spending  on  public  investment  is  not  included  in  the  calculation  of  the  excessive  deficit 
[H.M.Treasury, 1998]. The idea is that future generations, which will benefit from today’s public 
investment  should  contribute  to  it.14  However,  it  is  unclear  why  expenditure  on  physical 
infrastructure should count as public investment, while education does not. Also, if high investment 
                                                 
14 Which is why amortization of past investment should be included in any excessive deficit.  
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is needed today because the current generation has under-invested (as is argued in the UK) then 
surely it is this generation (rather than future ones) that should pay for making up the backlog.15 
Finally, the real issue is the relative contribution to the net present value of the future stream of 
welfare generated by future GDP of public investment (either tax or debt financed) compared to the 
contribution of money left in private hands (and either consumed or invested). It is very possible 
that  the  money  would  be  better  used  left  in  private  hands.  Public  over-investment  is  also  a 
possibility. 
ii. Allocation of deficit rights. This could be done either by the EU itself, or by a pseudo 
market mechanism. It is very unlikely that Member States would agree to give this power to the 
Commission, or that they could regularly agree on how to divide up the overall permitted deficit for 
the  eurozone  as  a  whole  (which  would  be  set  jointly  by  the  Commission  and  the  Council  of 
Ministers).16  Casella  [2001]  suggests  that  budget  deficit  permits  should  be  tradeable  among 
Member States (their total value would add up to a figure chosen each year at EU wide level). The 
key problem with this proposal is that the costs to the other members of the monetary union of a 
highly indebted large country increasing its deficit (and therefore its public debt) could be much 
greater than a slightly indebted small country doing so.17 
iii.  An  Independent  Fiscal  Authority.  Wyplosz  [2002]  has  suggested  the  creation  of 
independent  Fiscal  Policy  Committees  at  national  level  in  all  eurozone  member  states.  These 
would be to the macro-policy fiscal stance what independent central banks are to monetary policy. 
They would base their decision on the fiscal stance each year on the need to ensure long-term 
sustainability while minimising short-term GDP and price fluctuations. Even if politicians agreed to 
the  de-politicisation  of  the  fiscal  stance,  it  is  unclear  how  ministers  of  finance  could  vary 
expenditure and revenue so as to achieve the stance set by the FPC efficiently. One possibility 
would  be  for  most  of  the  short-term  changes  to  be  achieved  through  tax  rate  changes,  with 
expenditure variations being much slower. A possible difficulty in this case might be a relatively low 
level  of  response  of  aggregate  demand  to  what  would  be known  to  be  transitory  tax  changes 
[European Commission, 2002]. However, the strength of the proposal is that it sharply reduces the 
power of national politicians over fiscal policy, while at the same time establishing a framework 
which is designed to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability.  
iv. Making Debt Sustainability Central to the SGP. Pisani-Ferry [2002] suggests allowing 
countries  whose  public  debt/GDP  ratio  is  less  than  50%  to  opt  for  a  “debt  sustainability  pact” 
instead of the excessive deficit procedure. Countries which did so would be required to provide 
                                                 
15 This point was made by Dr. Bini-Smaghi at the Aspen European Dialogue conference, Venice 26-27 February 
2004. 
16 The proposal was originally made by Strauss-Khan in 1999 as a way of setting the maximum permitted deficit for 
the whole eurozone at 3% of GDP [Buti, Eijfinger and Franco, 2003]. Since different Member States would often be at 
different stages of the business cycle, this would allow many to have deficits far in excess of 3% and would sharply 
increase the average deficit of the whole eurozone. 
17 A debt-weighted premium could be added bureaucratically to the price. Alternatively, one could rely on the low 
deficit members of the union charging a higher price to a high risk purchaser of deficit rights so as to protect themselves 
from the spill-over effects.  
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estimates of the future impact of current budgetary commitments (such as the pension debt implicit 
in PAYG systems). Like the previous one, the proposal puts the stress where it should be – on 
sustainability. Its weaknesses are enforceability and the fact that implicit debt calculations are very 
sensitive to assumptions. 
5. Entrenched national guarantees of debt sustainability as a 
requirement for monetary union membership 
The  most  important  problems  with  fiscal  rules  in  the  EMU  is  their  enforceability  and  their 
legitimacy. Legitimacy itself requires: 
1.  That the rules be seen to be necessary; 
2.  That  the  rules  be  enforced  in  an  impartial  and  equal  manner  on  all  states  in  the 
eurozone.  
As we have seen, rules aimed at maintaining the sustainability of public finances are relatively 
easy to justify, while the need to avoid spill-over effects on aggregate demand is far less clear. As 
long as the imposition of sanctions for breaches of the SGP remains a political decision in the 
hands of national governments, large states will be unlikely to be punished. Yet it is precisely these 
states that most need to be controlled if the monetary rules of the eurozone are to be protected. 
There are two possible solutions to this conundrum: the first is to give far greater power in the 
fiscal sphere to the European Commission, which would be allowed both to issue warnings and to 
impose  fines  under  the  excessive  deficit  procedure.  I  find  such  a  degree  of  centralization 
uncongenial and unlikely to be politically acceptable to Member States.18    
The alternative is to require eurozone states to enact domestic fiscal rules, which would be 
entrenched (i.e. would require supermajorities to rescind) and which if rescinded, would lead to the 
countries concerned having to quit the eurozone. An interesting example of such rules is the Polish 
constitutional  limit  on  the  public  debt/GDP  ratio,  which  may  not  exceed  60%.19  It  has  the 
advantage of being both relevant (applies to debt sustainability) and enforceable. Countries that 
have adopted the euro could be required to enact a provision of this kind, so that budgets that 
caused the public debt/GDP ratio to exceed the limit would simply not have legal force.20 The rules 
could  be  more  detailed,  setting  out  what  was  required  of  budgets  in  the  case  when  the  ratio 
exceeded lower thresholds of 50% and 55%, as is done in the Polish “Law on Public Finance”.21   
Domestic fiscal rules cannot, by definition, be violated (a budget which violates such rules is 
simply not legal, and could not be enforced in domestic law). They can, however, be rescinded by 
                                                 
18 Buti et al. [2003] have the same view. 
19  By  being  part  of  the  constitution,  it  requires  a  two  thirds  majority  in  the  lower  house  (Sejm)  of  the  Polish 
parliament, together with a simple majority in the Senate, to overthrow it. 
20 This could present a problem in the case of the UK which does not have a written constitution or entrenched 
legislation. 
21 This is an ordinary, un-entrenched, provision.  
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sufficient super-majorities.22 However, under my proposal, countries which rescinded these rules 
(and thus break the conditions of eurozone membership) would automatically be required to leave 
the eurozone.23 This is presumably what would happen under present rules if a country broke the 
Maastricht  Treaty’s  requirement  that  its  central  bank  be  independent.24  Thus,  by  combining 
domestically  entrenched  fiscal  rules  (which  simply  cannot  be  legally  broken)  with  the  external 
anchor of their existence being a requirement for continued eurozone membership, we get fiscal 
rules that exhibit a very high degree of enforcement and yet do not centralise discretionary fiscal 
power at monetary union level.  
Given the drastic nature of expulsion from the monetary union as a sanction for breaking the 
public debt/GDP limit, it would be useful (as in the Polish case) to have lower thresholds in the 
domestic fiscal rules, the passing of which would require remedial action before the ultimate limit is 
reached. At present, Poland’s Law on Public Finance forbids any increase in the budget deficit 
once the ratio of public debt/GDP exceeds 50%, and any increase in the debt/GDP ratio once the 
55%  threshold  has  been  passed.  However,  these  rules  are  under  stress,  because  the  Miller 
government (October 2001 – May 2004) increased the deficit very fast (by some 4% of GDP since 
coming to power). This will probably result in the lowest threshold for remedial action (50%) not 
being effective, as public debt will jump directly from a planned 49% of GDP in 2003 to and actual 
57-59% in 2005.25 Thus, the Polish Law needs updating, so as to prevent a government “jumping” 
the lower thresholds on the growth of public debt in this way, and leaving its successor with the 
need to rein debt in drastically since it is right up against the constitutional 60% limit. Such a reform 
in the Polish case might consist in a requirement that deficits not exceed 3% if an even lower 
threshold of public debt/GDP (say 45%) is passed. 
Leaving aside the requirements of domestic law, within a reformed EMU, countries that violate 
a suitably chosen lower debt threshold could also loose their right to vote on the General Council of 
the ECB and in the “eurogroup” of finance ministers (which decides on fiscal policy co-ordination). 
This would prevent such countries’ representatives from voting in favour of inflationary policies that 
would help reduce their real debt burdens.26  
Expulsion from the eurozone would not necessarily mean that a country would be obliged to 
reintroduce its own national currency to replace the euro. Countries might decide to continue using 
the euro, but their central banks could no longer participate in its creation, in the setting of interest 
                                                 
22 Something which may yet happen in Poland. 
23 The new treaty (which would be needed for the implementation of this approach) would state categorically that 
countries which rescind the required legislation, automatically leave the eurozone. 
24  The  Governor  of  its  Central  Bank  would  presumably  be  excluded  from  the  ECB  Council  under  such 
circumstances,  and  if  the  central  bank  began  to  credit  the  government  or  “parastatal  agencies”  the  country  would 
presumably be asked to leave the ESCB and the eurozone.   
25 The problem lies in the fact that if the deficit is higher than planned in year t, the debt/GDP ratio may be certified 
as higher than 50% only in March of the year after (t+1). In that case the ban on increasing the deficit (compared to that 
of year t) applies to year t+2.   
26 The present deposits and fines for eurozone members running an excessive deficit do not seem to be incentive 
compatible, as they make fulfilment of the Maastricht Treaty requirement even harder.   
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rates for the euro area, in seignorage revenue from euro creation27 or in any implicit “lender of last 
resort” liquidity support which their banking systems might expect. They would then effectively be 
“unilaterally euroized”.28 At the very least an extremely strong signal will have been sent to the 
markets that the country is not in the same “risk league” as eurozone members, and that the risk of 
government default depends exclusively on the condition of its own public finances. Re-admission 
to the eurozone after expulsion would be made conditional on reintroduction of the domestic fiscal 
rules required by the Treaty, and on bringing the public debt/GDP ratio down below the Treaty’s 
lower debt threshold.  
There are, however, serious problems in implementing the proposal. The main one is that of 
“unequal starting points”. Italy and Greece (and to a lesser degree Belgium) have public debts that 
would be unacceptable if they obtained in the whole of the monetary union. We either have to 
accept that some countries are allowed to maintain higher public debts than others are allowed, or 
these debts must be reduced. A possible solution would be to give these countries a number of 
years derogation from the debt/GDP limit, during which time they would have to bring their ratios 
into line, or be automatically excluded from the union. 
The  second  problem  is  implicit  pension  debt. Pension  reforms  which  move  a  country  to  a 
system of “funded” pensions transform implicit pension debt into explicit government debt to the 
pension funds. Nearly every single country implementing such a reform would find that its public 
debt/GDP ratio would exceed 60% at the end of the transition.29 A 60% limit will thus discourage 
the  implementation  of  reforms,  so  a  higher  limit  needs  to  be  agreed for  countries  with funded 
pension systems.  
But what should that limit be? And would a limit of say 200% or 250% of GDP (which would be 
required for many countries after pension reform) lead to a sustainable debt? The two kinds of debt 
(implicit and explicit) are not, after all, fully comparable. Explicit debt is “harder”. Governments 
cannot renege on it as easily as they might be able to reduce expected (or current) pensions in 
case of severe fiscal stress. 
6. Conclusion: EMU is a “premature monetary union” 
The EMU is a “premature monetary union”. It is premature in its overall structure (i.e the absence 
of an effective fiscal constitution – which it vitally needs), and also in the admission of countries that 
should not have been admitted given that their debt/GDP ratios were at levels that would not be safe 
for the union as a whole (Greece, Italy and maybe Belgium). It is also premature in the sense that the 
                                                 
27 In the case of countries which are net contributors to the ECB (such as Germany) this could actually improve their 
financial position if the demand for euro money base growth was small or negative, and the net contribution to the ECB 
(which  is  the  difference  between  earnings  from  assets  backing  the  monetary  liabilities  of  the  national  central  bank 
concerned  and  the  country’s  share  in  total  eurozone  seignorage  based  equally  on  its  share  in  eurozone  GDP  and 
population) was large.    
28 I am grateful to Marek D￿browski for drawing this point to my attention. 
29 With the possible exceptions of the UK and Ireland.  
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rules  of  admission  to  the  union  are  not  well  designed,  particularly  as  regards  the  choice  of  the 
exchange  rate  at  which  currencies  will  be  converted  into  euros.  One  question  flowing  from  this 
analysis is whether EMU can be repaired “on the go” (is it, figuratively, a ship or a plane?). 
Second,  given  the  political  difficulty  of  enacting  the  reforms  I  have  suggested,  ,  the 
usefulness  of  such  proposals  (and  many  of  those  made  by  other  authors)  may  be  doubted. 
However, EMU may not be the last monetary union to be created. There has been talk of an East 
Asian Monetary Union. So analysing the errors that have been made in setting up the EMU need 
not be a pointless task, even if EMU itself proves unreformable.  
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